Article 26
Requires threat-led penetration testing for significant EU financial entities
DORA's threat-led penetration testing requirement is a higher bar than most financial entities realize. Sprocket delivers the adversarial testing, purple team validation, and supervisory-ready documentation your TLPT obligation demands.
Article 26
Requires threat-led penetration testing for significant EU financial entities
Every 3 years
Minimum TLPT cadence with ongoing ICT testing obligations between cycles under Article 25
87%
Of financial entities tested by Sprocket had a critical finding on their first DORA-scoped engagement
The Requirement
DORA is explicit: a point-in-time exercise won't satisfy a supervisory authority reviewing your Digital Operational Resilience Testing program. Article 26 sets the standard and it's more demanding than most financial entities have prepared for.
| REQUIREMENT | WHAT IT MEANS IN PRACTICE | HOW SPROCKET SATISFIES THE REQUIREMENT |
|---|---|---|
| Article 26 | Conduct intelligence-driven red team testing against live production systems at least every three years, following a defined three-phase structure - threat intelligence, red team execution, purple team validation - under supervisory authority oversight. | Sprocket works alongside your threat intelligence provider through all three TIBER-EU phases, with every phase documented to the standard a competent authority expects to review. |
| TLPT | Where standard penetration testing validates known attack paths, TLPT simulates a specific adversary, defined by threat intelligence, executing against your live production environment while supervisory authorities oversee the scope and outcomes. | Scenarios are defined by your threat intelligence provider, execution targets your production environment, and your supervisory authority gets evidence of a genuine adversarial exercise, not a scheduled scan with a red team label. |
| Article 25 | Maintain an ongoing Digital Operational Resilience Testing program independent of whether they're subject to TLPT. | Sprocket's continuous testing program keeps your Article 25 Digital Operational Resilience Testing obligation active across the full three-year cycle. |
| Article 28-30 | Your resilience obligations extend to your ICT supply chain, vendor integrations, third-party access paths, and critical provider dependencies are in scope, not just your own infrastructure. | Sprocket's continuous external attack surface management surfaces vendor integrations and supply chain exposure ongoing, with targeted testing of critical ICT dependencies that maps directly to your third-party risk register. |
Continuous external attack surface monitoring ensures environment changes don't create unvalidated exposure that your next threat intelligence provider has to discover from scratch.
Article 25 requires an ongoing testing program, and continuous testing gives your compliance team evidence of active resilience management that holds up to supervisory review at any point.
Continuous testing validates that SOC improvements identified during purple team exercises have actually held, and surfaces new gaps before they become material.
Ongoing monitoring of vendor integrations and internet-exposed dependencies is the only way to maintain supply chain visibility between formal third-party assessments under Articles 28–30.
The evidence record should precede the supervisory review, not follow it. Continuous penetration testing provides timestamped record of findings, remediation, and retesting from day one, so you're never reconstructing history when your competent authority asks for it.
What we find
Internet-facing VPN appliances and security gateways running unpatched firmware are exploited via known or zero-day vulnerabilities to achieve pre-authentication remote code execution. Three of the four most exploited vulnerabilities in 2024 were zero-days in security products from these vendors.
Open banking and embedded finance integrations with third-party providers are authorized with OAuth tokens granting read/write access to account data, transaction initiation, and customer PII. Tokens are long-lived (no rotation policy), stored in plaintext in application configuration files, and scoped far beyond the minimum permissions required for the integration's stated function.
FAQ
DORA applies to most EU financial entities. The TLPT requirement under Article 26 applies specifically to entities designated as significant by their competent authority. All in-scope entities have baseline ICT testing obligations under Article 25 regardless of designation. If you're uncertain, your national competent authority or legal team is the right starting point.
TIBER-EU is the ECB-developed framework DORA uses as its model for TLPT. It defines the three-phase structure of intelligence, red team execution, and purple team validation. If your organization has previously conducted a TIBER exercise, supervisory authorities will assess whether it meets current DORA requirements before crediting it.
In most cases, no. Standard pentests don't involve threat intelligence-driven scoping, live production testing, or purple team exercises. A strong continuous testing program does satisfy Article 25's baseline obligation.
A purple team exercise replays red team techniques with your SOC present to evaluate whether your team would have detected and responded to them. DORA requires it because operational resilience means detecting and containing attacks, not just preventing them.
A qualified threat intelligence provider must define the threat landscape targeting your organization before red team execution begins. This is why TLPT cannot be scoped by the financial entity or tester alone.
Articles 28 - 30 require your resilience program to account for vendor integrations and critical ICT dependencies, not just your own infrastructure.
Other Frameworks Sprocket Supports